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Abstract
This paper, on the one hand, goes a step closer to demonstrate the causality of
social capital on economic performance. On the other hand, we confirm a continued
role of social capital effects on economic performance in this paper by using a much
larger sample, spanning three decades and increasing the scope of countries.
This paper is unique in the sense that it contributes to revisiting questions of eco-
nomic performance, social capital and institutions with a clearly better and updated
dataset from the last 28 years building upon existing empirical evidence. We em-
ploy a longitudinal analysis (pooled unbalanced multiple cross-section datasets) with
fixed effects in this study. Our sample includes both the World Values Survey and
European Values Study dating back to the 1980s.
Our results are twofold: Firstly, to confirm that trust has a significant positive effect
on growth. And more importantly, they have a significant effect on growth for at
least 5 years (for growth at 5, 7 and 10 years following a period of trust measure).
Secondly, associational activities - another measure in the overarching definitions
of social capital, along with institutions, inequality, and education are consistently
significant determinants of trust.1
Keywords: interpersonal trust, trust, associational activities, social capital, eco-
nomic development, institutions, inequality
JEL classification: Z13, O11, O43
∗rakeshguptanr@gmail.com
1 I am very thankful for the support of Agence Franc¸aise de De´veloppement (AFD), and thanks to
the research agreement between AFD and ESSEC-CODEV on the Relational Capability Index. I am
also thankful for the support of Chaire E´nergie et Prospe´rite´. I also appreciate the feedback from the
conference participants where I presented this paper - Human Development and Capability Association
2014, and International Initiative for Promotion of Political Economy 2014.
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1 Introduction
The seminal work of Knack and Keefer (1997) is one of the most cited articles using
social capital to explain economic growth. They attempted to quantify social capital by
evoking those ideas as theorized by Putnam et al. (1993) and Olson (1982). In a nutshell,
they present strong evidence of the relationship between interpersonal trust, norms of
civic cooperation and economic performance (as measured by GDP growth); and their
respective determinants. They also allow for the conflicting definitions of social capital in
terms of associational activities as put forth by Putnam et al. (1993) and Olson (1982) in
their analysis on their relationship with economic performance. Ever since their paper,
the research has been provided impetus to head in different directions - social capital has
gone to become all-encompassing and elusive by the day, to notions of civic behavior,
social norms, networks or cooperation and social cohesion. A significant amount of micro
empirical evidence has been sought to strengthen the foundations for these theories and
legitimize what is reflected in their macro counterparts.2 And the most prominent
measures of social capital, “Interpersonal Trust” has undergone several tests.3 We are
interested in this - how persistent is this prominent form of question (most used indicator
of social capital) of “Interpersonal Trust”, or rather simply “generalized trust”45 - does
this continue to have a positive effect on economic development? In particular, we
believe to bring ourselves closer through this paper to the causal relationship of trust
on economic development by calibrating the variables, and to show that this is a cross-
national global phenomenon by significantly increasing the sample size and time - without
even having to control for region specific effects.6
This important work of Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer has been met with a fair share
of criticisms. Questions on robustness, inconsistencies and small sample problems have
been raised.7 The most recent work of Algan and Cahuc (2014) provides an excellent
summary of the entire literature on social capital and economic development. On the
other hand, this earlier work of Durlauf and Fafchamps (2004) have potently expressed
the pitfalls of the social capital research, not the least to denounce the powerful insights
this branch of research has provided us. These and many other works in this domain of
research should serve us as a basis for understanding this present paper and the entire
social capital research in general.
2 Casey and Christ (2005), Helliwell (2004), Woolcock and Narayan (2000), Scheepers et al. (2002)
and several others.
3 Delhey et al. (2011), Dasgupta (2009), Reeskens (2013) and Robbins (2012) among the recent ones.
4 Question asked in the surveys: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted
or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?”
5 To quote Rothstein and Stolle (2008), “...These attitudes of trust are generalized when they go
beyond specific personal settings in which the partner to be cooperated with is already known.”
6 Guiso et al. (2007) for a historical approach to the question of social capital (a very long term
approach of Putnam’s ideas) and economic development.
7 Beugelsdijk et al. (2004) and Bjornskov (2007) among others discuss these problems at length.
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Our preliminary results with our dataset encompassing more recent, enhanced and com-
prehensive information led us to continue in the similar direction as Knack and Keefer
(1997) with a fine-tuned empirical strategy. Interpersonal trust continues to emerge as
one of the significant variables over time and space. In our opinion, interpersonal trust is
important in itself and a principal actor of social cohesion in a society which contributes
to having far reaching effects on efficient and better functioning of societies. The paper
by Giraud et al. (2012) is one of the important motivations to undertake this study.
Their approach puts social networks central to the conception of human development
and at the same time, acknowledges the diversity of personal and collective values and
their specific ends - which we believe to be ingrained in Sen’s capability approach (Sen
(1976) and Sen (2009)) and insofar as complementing Rawlsian maximin view (Rawls
(1971)). The three dimensions of the relational capabilities they distinguish are given
below:
1. To be integrated into networks;
2. To have specific attachments to others, including friendship and love;
3. To commit to a project within a group: which aims at serving a common good or
a social interest, to take part in decision-making in a political society.
The third dimension mentioned above of the Relational Capability Indicator (RCI) indi-
cator has a civic commitment dimension which is of special interest to this paper, since
we empirically explore the works of Olson and Putnam alongside the RCI. This civic
dimension of the RCI is composed of the following five components:8
1. Membership: Active membership in a group (religious, trade-unions and/or busi-
ness associations)
2. Collective action: Participation in political actions
3. Vote: Voting behavior of the agent
4. Solidarity: Active membership in a common interest group
5. Trust in others: Trust in unknown people
As we embark to make precise the question of the interlinkages between social capital,
institutions and economic performance, we put forth some evidence found so far in the
literature which undeniably highlights the gaps despite some groundbreaking findings.
Among the questions that we explore in this paper, the principal one is the following:
does the trust measure of social capital (or simply, generalized trust) continue to be
persistent in having positive effects on economic performance? We do so by exploiting
8 A full table of RCI dimensions and components is to be found in the appendix.
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all the survey waves available till date from the World Values Survey and European
Values Study, aggregated from over 430,000 nationally representative observations. This
translates into 292 countries-surveys sample starting from 1980 up until 2009.
The importance of social capital and its relationship to economic performance and its
trends is not new to political science, although the last twenty years have seen a signifi-
cant interest that is to be found in the literature using measurable variables implemented
to empirically test this effect inspired from sociology, political science and (behavioral)
economics. This trend has its origins to the seminal work of Robert Putnam in his
book by (Putnam et al., 1993), where Putnam used a comparison of societies in the
North and South of Italy. In this early definition, social capital was identified with
those ”... features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks that can
improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions” (page 167). The
natural experiment from 1970 where the highly centralized Italian government devolved
power to the newly created regional governments, was used by Putnam to analyze how
two regions with essentially identical institutions can have such different political and
economic outcomes.
What he finds is that the North outperforms the South of Italy in their collective action
outcomes, which he refers to as Northern Italy having higher levels of civic engagement
or civic-mindedness. He continues to claim that this distinction of civic engagement or
civic-mindedness between the North and the South of Italy determines the economic per-
formance, more than political institutions which are a result of the process of democracy
as proposed by most of the growth literature.
The role of associational activities in economic performance at a predefined observed
group level has garnered much contention over the past decades.9 Contrary to this
prevalent view of Putnam, Olson’s seminal work - Olson (1982), that has received its due
attention, is of the opinion that Putnam style horizontal associations with the shared-
values of solidarity and common good are not sufficient to promote growth. A group
which works for shared interests helps resolve collective action problems, and this group
relies on a system of selective incentives to tackle the problem of free-riding (as monitor-
ing in larger groups tends to be harder). Olson claims that after a certain point, these
(special interest) same groups may get overboard in acting as special interest groups
lobbying for preferential policies. According to him, in certain situations, this behavior
will naturally render the economic growth to fizzle, since they divert the scarce economic
resources away from technological advances and other growth-enhancing activities. Al-
though, according to Heckelman (2007) in his review of Olson’s book, he suggests that
there is only partial support of Olson’s theory - which Olson himself has repeatedly
acknowledged to his critics, as they are meant to illustrate certain specific aspects of his
9 Cross-country level analysis undertaken for this paper.
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general theory.1011
The following were the questions included in the World Values Survey and the Euro-
pean Values Study in the last two survey waves. Although World Value Survey does
better in asking respondents to measure the density/intensity of their involvements in
the associational groups, this is excluded in the European Values Survey. Hence, in the
interest of consistency, we leave out the intensity of participation in groups in our anal-
ysis. We follow a simple aggregation method of average number of associational groups’
membership in each country. The following are the questions available in the surveys:
(a) Member: Belong to social welfare service for elderly
(b) Member: Belong to religious organization (P-GROUP)
(c) Member: Belong to education, arts, music or cultural activities (P-GROUP)
(d) Member: Belong to labor unions (O-GROUP)
(e) Member: Belong to political parties (O-GROUP)
(f) Member: Belong to local political actions
(g) Member: Belong to human rights
(h) Member: Belong to conservation, the environment, ecology, animal rights
(i) Member: Belong to conservation, the environment, ecology, animal rights
(j) Member: Belong to professional associations (O-GROUP)
(k) Member: Belong to youth work (P-GROUP)
(l) Member: Belong to sports or recreation (potential P-GROUP)
(m) Member: Belong to women’s group (potential O-GROUP)
(n) Member: Belong to peace movement (potential P-GROUP)
(o) Member: Belong to organization concerned with health
(p) Member: Belong to consumer groups
(q) Member: Belong to other groups12
To quote from Knack and Keefer (1997, p. 1273), “We explored this possibility fur-
ther by attempting to differentiate “Putnamian” from “Olsonian” groups. Groups b, c,
10 To quote from his article [pg. 28], “...In general, the theory of institutional sclerosis has often been
used by other scholars to successfully explain experiences throughout history, but only rarely has it come
out unscathed.”
11 The other significant works on social capital of Bourdieu and Coleman are out of the scope of this
paper.
12 Questions (l)-(q) are new additions in the World Values Survey and European Values Study.
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and k from the above list were identified as those groups least likely to act as “distribu-
tional coalitions” but which involve social interactions that can build trust and cooperative
habits. Groups d, e, and j were deemed most representative of groups with redistributive
goals.”
Our “group” measure includes the additional questions (those that are potentially Put-
namian and Olsonian groups), whereas our O-GROUPS and P-GROUPS are con-
structed in the same fashion to include the same groups as presented in the paper by
Knack and Keefer (1997).13
There is another major strand of research which considers (interpersonal) trust as an
output of social capital.14 This measure of (interpersonal) trust has been extensively
empirically tested and beginning to be applied as a standard determinant of economic
growth in the literature.15
It is worth noting that research on the questions of trust has developed somewhat more
independent of social capital research categorized by academic disciplines. What has
been established is that more “trusting” societies are countries that have grown faster in
the recent decades as opposed to other comparable countries.16 We do not attempt to
question the already existing evidence in the literature on the (direct) positive effects of
social capital on economic performance. What has also been established is the important
role of “good” institutions on economic performance of societies or countries - we do
not attempt to contest that either.17 Given this background, and thanks to the latest
available dataset which includes information, we propose to make precise the causality
in terms of the variables in an accounting sense, i.e., a given level of trust at a given
point of time may cause economic development (growth) for 5, 7, 10 years or even more.
To condense the econometric specification difficulties, we can categorize them into two
broad categories: First, the reverse causality between trust at one period of time (here,
survey wave) and economic development (here, growth) experienced at the same time.18
13 Membership profiles (country averages) for our 2000 and 2008 samples are found in the appendix.
14 We also test for the sensitivity of different measures of trust - “trust in neighborhood”, “trust in
foreigners”, “trust in people outside the neighborhood”, etc. Our forthcoming paper using Gallup data
allows for better use of this information allowing for disaggregation by education, gender and income
levels to mention a few.
15 Cf. Knack (2003), Beugelsdijk et al. (2004), Beugelsdijk (2006), Bjornskov (2007), Berggren et al.
(2008) among others.
16 See Whiteley (2000), Zak and Knack (2001) and Beugelsdijk et al. (2004) which address this question
more directly in comparison to other papers on social capital in the literature.
17 Bjornskov (2012) in their paper present various transmission channels - where “good” institutions
and education emerge as significant channels of trust’s influence on economic performance.
18 This paper of Algan and Cahuc (2010) has accounted for initial trust (to make precise - origin
country’s trust of an immigrant in the US) or as they call it, “inherited trust” of a person. It could also
be the (shared) values of a population that creates the trust among people within a population - refer
to Uslaner (2002) and Tabellini (2007).
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This is controlled for in a simple and seemingly powerful way (refer to the paragraph
above, and more detailed explanation in the Methodology section). Second, the omitted
variable bias which affects both trust and economic development (through the error term
of the regression equation) remains to be verified in our specification since these can
most often be controlled for observing historical variations that affects trust behaviors,
commonly referred to as “natural experiments”, or through an extraneous exogenous
instrument through an instrumental variable identification.
However, we already know how unreliable are the measures of institutional quality.19 We
demonstrate these difficulties by using different measures and to show how sensitive these
measures are to the model specification and on the point estimates of the regressions.
The same argument applies to geographical factors, environmental factors, social norms
and culture which more often is intangible and sometimes impossible to quantify.
2 Data
We have used data from several sources like the Integrated Values Survey (merging
World Values Survey (WVS) and European Values Study (EVS)) which has the five
World Values Survey and the four European Values Study, Penn World Table 7.1
and 8.0 (PWT), World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI), UNU-WIDER
World Income Inequality Database (WIID), Ethnologue, Fractionalization and Polar-
ization indicators of Alesina et al. (2003) and their disaggregated measures of Esteban
and Ray’s (“frac fear”), Barro-Lee dataset of educational attainment and enrollment
estimates (BL), UN-UIS UNESCO Statistics (UIS) for alternative educational enroll-
ment/attainment data, World Bank - World Governance Indicators dataset (WGI),
Freedom House (FH), Heritage Foundation (HF), International Country Risk Guide
(ICRG), Economic Freedom Network, and the Central Intelligence Agency - The World
Factbook (CIA) as well for the gini coefficient estimates.
2.1 Variables of interest
Find below the variables information implemented in our regressions:20
Growth: 5, 7 and 10 years annualized average GDP growth following the period of the
values survey. This is obtained from the Penn World Table 8.0 version.
19 Oman and Arndt (2006), Arndt (2008), Langbein and Knack (2008) and Razafindrakoto and
Roubaud (2010) provide a detailed discussion on problems facing a variety of institutional quality vari-
ables.
20 Detailed descriptive statistics of all variables are found in the appendix.
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Table 1: Table of number of countries, years and sources
Wave Countries Survey years Ref. year Surveys
1 26 1981-84 1980 WVS
2 37 1989-93 1990 WVS+EVS
3 52 1994-98 1995 WVS+EVS
4 72 1999-04 2000 WVS+EVS
5 58 2005-09 2005 WVS
6 47 2008-09 2005 EVS
292
1. The Integrated Values Survey (WVS and EVS) has 292 countries-surveys observations in total. Some
of the countries that repeated in both surveys have been eliminated (and with similar scores like Sweden
and Turkey around the 2000 survey waves).
2. Some countries with extreme values like Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1998 (36.74% annualized average
growth for 5 years following 1998) is removed from the sample. Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and Russia
in 1990 following the Soviet Union (USSR) disintegration (-15%, -12%, -9% and -7% annualized average
growth observed respectively) have been removed as well.
Trust: Average of trust levels within a country which is computed as percentage of
trusting population in a country. The question used for this, “Generally speaking, would
you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing
with people? Possible answers: 1. Most people can be trusted 0. You can never be too
careful when dealing with others”
GDP/capita: GDP/capita PPP (constant 2005 International USD) using chain series -
for the years pertaining to the reference year of the survey wave. This is sourced from
Penn World Table 8.0. To normalize, we use the natural log transformation.2122
Education: Average total schooling years of the 25-year old population of a country for
the survey reference year is taken for our education variable among several measures
available.23 This is sourced from the Barro-Lee dataset. As an alternative we have also
used the latest “Index of Human Capital” from the Penn World Table 8.0 (based on
Barro-Lee’s educational attainment and Psacharopoulos’ returns to education).
Price level of investment: Investment goods prices, PPP-adjusted (constant 2005 Inter-
national USD) for the years pertaining to the survey year of the respective country. This
is also sourced from the Penn World Table 8.0. This is now called the “price of capital
formation” in the latest version of Penn World Table.
21 This is fairly standard in the empirical literature.
22 PPP - purchasing power parity.
23 This we believe is better than using the educational attainment statistics for 20 years prior to the
survey year since, this 25-year old population compose the active working population in a country.
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Population: Population data also retrieved from Penn World Table 8.0. We use the
natural log transformation in our analysis.
Civic: Respondents of the survey chose a number from 1 (never justifiable) to 10 (always
justifiable). We reversed these scales in the interest of consistency and comparability
which are to be found in all the four survey waves of WVS and EVS,24 so that larger
values indicate greater cooperation, and summed values over the four items to create a
scale (CIVIC) with a 40-point maximum. The following are the four questions:
1. “Claiming government benefits to which you are not entitled”
2. “Avoiding a fare on public transport”
3. “Cheating on taxes if you have the chance”
4. “Someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties”25
GROUPS: The average of the memberships that are binary coded for the questions
(a)-(r) aforementioned in the “Introduction” section and aggregated as a cross-country
average (1 = Belong; 0 = not mentioned).
Putnamian groups: Indicator constructed as an average of memberships within a country
for the following groups - belong to religious organization, belong to education, arts, music
or cultural activities, and belong to youth work.
Olsonian groups: Indicator constructed as an average of memberships within a country
for the following groups - belong to labor unions, belong to political parties, and belong
to professional associations.26
Inequality (gini coefficients): The Gini coefficient estimates are sourced from the Pov-
calNet.27 Whenever necessary, the imputed/interpolated gini coefficient are used; and
not for countries where data is missing with a gap of long periods of time (say, over 5
years).28
24 We have ignored two additional questions from the EVS - “Paying cash for services to avoid taxes”
and “Joyriding”.
25 The following question has been discontinued as found in the earlier survey waves of WVS and EVS
- “failing to report damage you’ve done accidentally to a parked vehicle.”.
26 We present all the variables used here. However, our analysis on correlations of associational behavior
and trust/growth/institutions is not the focus of this paper since these questions are not found in all the
survey waves of WVS and EVS.
27 “PovcalNet: the online tool for poverty measurement developed by the Development Research Group
of the World Bank” http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/.
28 We test alternative gini coefficient estimates from World Bank - WDI, CIA - The World Factbook
and the UNU - WIID, in the interest of checking for the sensitivity of measures and different distributional
definitions used.
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Ethnicity: A range of indicators have been used to represent different identities of indi-
viduals from Ethnologue database - ethnic, linguistic, religion and ethno-linguistic indi-
cators; Esteban and Ray dataset “frac fear” indicator; and data from Fearon and Laitin
(2003) - ELF(1), ELF(6), ELF(15), POL(1), POL(6) and POL(15) for different levels
of aggregation of ethno-linguistic fractionalization and polarization respectively. Our
primary variable of interest among the alternatives available are sourced from Alesina
et al. (2003), which is a measure of “the probability that two random citizens of a given
country belong to the same ethnic group”.
Institutions -
World Governance Indicators: “Rule of Law” - 2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) is used.29
Economic Freedom in the World: Sourced from the Economic Freedom Network (on a
scale of 1 to 10).
ICRG: Dataset titled “International Country Risk Guide (ICRG)” from the PRS Group
is used. Their information goes back to 1980s including over 140 countries.
Freedom House: “Rule of Law” and “Functioning of the Government” as a measure of
institutional quality used. Their most prominent “Polity2” dataset has also been used
for country scores to test for the sensitivity of the measures used.
Heritage Foundation: Property rights protection composite scores of countries used al-
ternatively as well.
3 Methodology
At the outset, as have been largely accepted, we concur that the channels of trust among
people (or social capital in general) is instrumental for economic development via cer-
tain means (for example, institutions). Trusting people cooperate towards various ends
- (co)providing public goods, facilitating interaction as efficient economic agents, for-
mal/informal solidarity activities via organizations or institutions and even redistribute
among a society or population.30
29 Cf. Kaufmann et al. (2010).
30 Krishna, Uphoff, and Esman (1997) in their book, and Uphoff’s work through 1970s until late
1990s was inadvertent documenting of context specific social capital where its latent dominant aspect
being existing or created trust. There are two takeaways from their work for this paper: Firstly, trust
manifests in a plethora of forms and is very context specific. Secondly, trust is not only a predisposition
to cooperate and participate in efficient economic activities, but also a force of conflict resolution derived
from incentives to cooperate based on trust.
10
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In this section, we will discuss the three specifications which make the core of our paper.
First and foremost, as mentioned earlier, is the testing of the persistence of “Interpersonal
Trust” as a measure of social capital - if it continues to play an important role in economic
development. More specifically, as the existing empirical literature suggests that trust
is a more or less positive and statistically significant factor in affecting growth. It is
at least, definitely positive correlated to growth. We wanted to test if generalized trust
continues to have the same positive (significant) effect on economic development, and
we also test if the same effect holds over time, that is to say, when several periods taken
together. Empirical evidence is aplenty, and has tested a diverse set of hypotheses, in
different levels of analysis - micro, meso and macro.
Simply put, the uniqueness of our paper in testing generalized trust effects on economic
development lies in the following:
• Testing the persistence of trust effects on economic performance over three decades
with the largest available sample.
• We also believe to come closer to the causal relationship of trust and economic
performance.
This is executed, not in the sense of repeated cross-section regressions (cross-country
study), but, in the sense of taking all the available data together - in other words, pooled
unbalanced multiple cross-section datasets. And our hypothesis being is the generalized
trust persistent? A longitudinal analysis is not possible, since we do not observe same
countries included in the values surveys over different survey waves.31 A repeated cross-
section is helpful, but not sufficient - it loses its utility since some of the variables’
significance changes drastically over survey waves and sources (WVS, EVS, European
Social Survey, Global Barometer Surveys etc.).32 Hence, the most appropriate approach
is to pool all these seemingly similar databases together; and to have wave fixed effects
to control for the aforementioned problems.33
31 Moreover, they are not deemed to be representative for each particular survey wave. See Berggren
et al. (2008) and Beugelsdijk et al. (2004)
32 Find the discussion in Bjornskov (2007). The sample of countries varies largely over time to include
countries that have made the surveys representative over recent years/waves (at least starting late 1990s)
as demonstrated in this paper. Figure 1 confirms that the 30+ countries added in the latest wave of
WVS and EVS combined doesn’t induce sampling bias of low-trust or high-trust profile countries. This
is contrary to other papers’ claim.
Most importantly, they also demonstrate that generalized trust measure is stable over time, and hence
countries are path dependent per se, along their initial trust levels. This also implies that the trust values
are stationary - all the variation is random - another argument against longitudinal analysis. But, crucial
to this is doing away with data points which we find commonly in the literature by using average values
for countries where more than one trust values are found, and this reduces the sample size drastically.
33 Wave fixed effects to control for our unbalanced sample since we cover all the survey waves. This is
important since most of the countries included in the earlier waves were developed economies. Gradually,
11
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Figure 1: CDF of Generalized Trust of all countries in our 2000 and 2005 reference year’s samples
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Average cross-country interpersonal trust levels. Summary tables found in the appendix.
The (Interpersonal) trust levels globally seems unchanged, although there were some “gainers” and
“losers”.
Most importantly, there is no sample enlargement induced bias created between these two waves.
Refer to the appendix for the chart on the longitudinal changes in the trust levels across countries.
How do we come closer to a causal relationship? It’s quite simple: we construct the
growth variables of 5, 7 and 10 years annualized average which follows the generalized
trust measures from survey years (reference years). For instance, a trust score at time t
is regressed on average annualized growth variables at t+5, t+7 and t+10. By doing so,
we also ensure that the growth regressed on trust doesn’t overlap for countries-surveys
combination;34 and of course, by construct, trust “causes” future periods of growth.
Equation 1:35
more and more poor and developing countries have been included in the WVS and EVS surveys (and as
mentioned earlier, have induced sample bias especially in the third and fourth survey waves).
Results with and without wave fixed effects are to be found in the appendix.
It’s also difficult to have country fixed effects. Since, to stress again, it’s an unbalanced sample.
34 For example, Argentina, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Mexico, South Africa, South Korea, Spain,
Sweden, United Kingdom and United States are found in all the five survey waves.
35 Additional controls of institutions, ethnicity and inequality were tested without results changing
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Growth(gi,t) = αt + β1∗trusti,t + β2∗ln(gdp/capita)i,t + β3∗educi,t +
β4∗price level of investmenti,t + , i = 1, ..., Nt = 1, ..., T.
Secondly, we also test a few standard variables expected to affect institutions. Gener-
alized trust is of course the prime candidate, which is expected to channelize to create
various types of institutions.36 And thirdly, trust which is formed from various types of
cultural norms,37 individual backgrounds and environmental factors, tangible or other-
wise is our third set of regressions where we attempt to find the determinants of trust at
the individual level from personal characteristics and demographics which our dataset
allows us to explore.38
Equation 2:
Institutions(It) = αt + β1∗trusti,t + β2∗Xi,t + , i = 1, ..., Nt = 1, ..., T.
X = GDP/capita, Population, Education, Ethnic diversity and inequality among others.
Equation 3 (Logistic regression micro-estimates):
Pr(Trust(ti,j) = 1 | X) = αj + β1∗Xi,j + , i = 1, ..., Nj = 1, ..., T.
X = Age, Age squared, Married, Children, Sex, Education levels, Employment, Subjec-
tive income, Habitat size and Spiritual denomination.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the variables used in equation 1
variable N mean p25 p50 p75 sd min max
growth5 275 3.31 1.17 2.97 5.18 3.11 -4.66 15.11
growth7 233 4.29 1.93 3.80 6.02 3.08 -3.59 17.97
growth10 233 4.40 2.23 3.82 5.54 3.20 -0.87 19.86
Trust 291 0.30 0.19 0.27 0.40 0.16 0.04 0.76
Education 251 8.61 7.05 9.05 10.35 2.46 1.16 13.19
ln(gdp/capita) 275 9.44 8.87 9.56 10.32 1.05 5.42 11.38
gdpcapita 275 19,040.90 7,080.98 14,156.64 30,392.14 14,795.98 225.48 87,845.73
much. Interactions terms were also used.
36 Roughly speaking: Social capital → Institutions → Economic development
37 See Tabellini (2010) and Guiso et al. (2004) for examples from Europe and within Italy.
38 In equations 1 and 2, i refers to countries, but i refers to the individual in equation 3. t refers to the
year or the survey waves in all equations. αt refers to the survey wave fixed effects coefficients. Lastly,
in equation 3, j refers to the countries.
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics of the variables used in equation 2
variable N mean p25 p50 p75 sd min max
Economic Freedom 257 6.72 6.07 6.95 7.54 1.13 3.03 9.03
Rule of Law 166 0.42 -0.44 0.36 1.32 1.00 -1.77 1.98
Property Rights 212 57.92 32.50 50.00 90.00 24.25 10.00 95.00
Trust 292 0.30 0.19 0.27 0.40 0.16 0.04 0.76
ln(gdp/capita) 276 9.43 8.86 9.55 10.32 1.06 5.42 11.38
ln(population) 276 9.77 8.55 9.70 10.97 1.65 5.43 14.08
Education 251 8.61 7.05 9.05 10.35 2.46 1.16 13.19
Inequality (gini coeff.) 271 35.83 30.10 33.30 40.70 8.99 17.80 67.40
Ethnic fractionalization 279 0.32 0.12 0.26 0.51 0.23 0.00 0.93
Table 4: Descriptive statistics of the variables used in equation 3
variable N mean p25 p50 p75 sd min max
Trust 400292 0.29 0 0 1 0.45 0 1
Life satisfaction 415475 6.71 5 7 9 2.43 1 10
Happy 409932 1.97 1 2 2 0.73 1 4
Age 417125 42.09 28 40 54 16.75 13 108
Age sq. 417125 2052 784 1600 2916 1575.75 169 11664
Married 416237 0.58 0 1 1 0.49 0 1
Sex 417049 0.47 0 0 1 0.50 0 1
(Sub.) Income 307985 4.68 3 4 6 2.45 1 11
No. of children 340241 1.86 0 2 3 1.76 0 8
Child 340241 0.71 0 1 1 0.45 0 1
Education 321361 4.68 3 5 6 2.18 1 8
Employment 409831 3.24 1 3 5 2.17 1 8
Self-employed 409831 0.09 0 0 0 0.28 0 1
Student 409831 0.07 0 0 0 0.26 0 1
Employment1 409831 0.54 0 1 1 0.50 0 1
Employment1(ext) 409831 0.69 0 1 1 0.46 0 1
Full-employment 409831 0.38 0 0 1 0.49 0 1
Unemployed 409831 0.09 0 0 0 0.28 0 1
Habitat size 297689 4.74 2 5 7 2.50 1 8
Religious 385549 0.70 0 1 1 0.46 0 1
Atheist 385549 0.05 0 0 0 0.21 0 1
Protestant 369786 0.15 0 0 0 0.36 0 1
Muslim 369786 0.15 0 0 0 0.35 0 1
Buddhist 369786 0.02 0 0 0 0.13 0 1
Catholic 369786 0.34 0 0 1 0.47 0 1
Hindu 369786 0.02 0 0 0 0.15 0 1
Jew 369786 0.01 0 0 0 0.08 0 1
Sunni 369786 0.01 0 0 0 0.08 0 1
Shia 369786 0.01 0 0 0 0.10 0 1
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4 Results
A measurable definition of social capital through the question of interpersonal trust
among people which has been used as an indicator of social capital is gaining importance.
In this paper, we revisit the hypotheses of generalized trust and its effects on economic
development, their links with institutional quality, and their determinants at the micro
level. We have a larger and a newer dataset.
4.1 Trust and Economic Development - cross-country analysis
Table 5: Trust on Growth - cross-country fixed effects regressions 1980-2009
(1) (2) (3)
Growth5 Growth7 Growth10
Trust 3.966∗∗∗ 3.882∗∗ 5.091∗∗∗
(0.73) (1.04) (0.90)
ln(GDP/capita) -1.157∗ -1.338∗ -1.681∗∗
(0.51) (0.58) (0.45)
Investment -2.968∗ -3.529∗∗ -3.390∗∗
(1.35) (1.21) (0.90)
Education 0.047 0.131 0.059
(0.11) (0.13) (0.16)
Constant 14.217∗∗ 16.187∗∗ 19.392∗∗∗
(3.67) (3.95) (2.61)
Observations 235 198 198
R2 0.319 0.362 0.517
Adjusted R2 0.307 0.349 0.507
Standard errors in parentheses
Huber and White robust standard errors
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
39
Before we continue to interpret the results from the analysis we undertook; we need to
remind ourselves the objective of this paper - Does the generalized trust persistently
have positively effects on economic development? And of course, the manner in which
we compute our average annualized growth variable that follows the respective reading
39 1. Without wave fixed effects tables presented in appendix.
2. “Index of human capital” sourced from the latest PWT 8.0 which is based on educational attainment
- Barro and Lee (2010) and returns to education - Psacharopoulos (1994). This is an alternative for total
schooling years (not just secondary school years’ average which is the standard usage in the literature).
Results do not change much on the choice of variable.
3. Dependent variables are average annualized growth of 5, 7 and 10 years following the average gener-
alized trust scores within a country.
Excluded countries from the regressions for reasons mentioned earlier are: Latvia (1990), Lithuania
(1990), Estonia (1990), Russia (1990), Romania (1993), Belarus (1990), Bulgaria (1991), Hungary (1991)
and Bosnia and Herzegovina (1998).
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of trust levels, brings us closer to the causality argument.40
For one percentage point increase in trust levels, the average growth is expected to
increase by 3.96%, 3.88% and 5.09% over 5, 7 and 10 year horizon, holding all other
variables constant, in the cross-country sense. This could imply that the relative trust
level effects across all countries of the world on economic performance is “high” in the
context of growth rates between four and five percent, which is substantially large,
especially so after the 2008 global financial crisis.4142 These are of course, positive and
significant at 1% level (5% in equation 2) in the three specifications.
The results are indeed encouraging - the adjusted R squared - which is the explanatory
power of the model, is in the upper bound of the estimates compared to other empirical
papers in the literature. This is encouraging since most of the other papers have included
few survey waves or have had a regional focus. Another interesting observation emerges
here - the adjusted R squared increases from model (1) to model (3) - this suggests that
the impact of trust on growth increases over the time horizon where trust levels have a
lasting effect, on average, across countries on economic performance.
Another check of validity has been undertaken - we test these three models with re-
gional dummies and “levels of development” dummies.4344 Regional dummies don’t
have any effect. However, the “levels of development” dummies have a significant effect
on growth confirming their fixed effects. This is also reflected in the investment vari-
ables always remaining negative; and the education variable not being significant. This
could be explained by the fact that growth in the 1990s and 2000s (unlike the historical
development episodes of the now developed countries which was heavily dependent on
education, skilled population share of the country and human capital accumulation in
general) are eminent from the emerging countries where the traditional measures are
on average low, like the school enrollment and educational attainment rates. A better
measure of human capital is required to correctly attribute the impact of education in
this diverse and dynamic world. Nonetheless, the education variable is always positive,
but not statistically significant.
Econometrically speaking, magnitude of the trust coefficients’ positive effects on growth
is higher compared to other papers in the empirical literature. The following are among
the possible reasons: First, larger sample of high and low trust profile countries with
different levels of development (per capita incomes), and the clear specification of growth
following trust. This means the cross-sectional differences are important in having a
40 Haussman test implemented to ensure fixed effects to be a good fit, and not random effects.
41 Under the assumption that our sample is representative.
42 However, the latest wave of WVS from 2010-2014 recently released needs to be exploited to verify
the magnitude and signs of these results.
43 World Bank Income Groups and Regional Groups of countries of the world classification used for
this purpose.
44 Refer to the regression table 11 in the appendix.
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positive effect on growth. Second, it could also mean the omitted variable bias (OVB)
or the error term is correlated to both trust and growth variables - making trust variable
capture some of the variation in the data.
4.2 Institutions and Trust - cross-country analysis
Table 6: Institutions and Trust - cross-country fixed effects regressions 1980-2009
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ICRG Economic freedom Rule of law Property rights
Trust 0.327∗∗∗ 1.083∗ 1.176∗∗ 19.838
(0.04) (0.46) (0.21) (12.87)
ln(GDP/capita refyr) 0.129∗∗∗ 0.669∗∗∗ 0.648∗∗∗ 14.942∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.10) (0.06) (0.89)
ln(Pop in ’000 refyr) -0.009 -0.025 -0.084∗∗ -1.767
(0.01) (0.05) (0.01) (1.13)
Education 0.001 0.007 -0.032 -0.166
(0.01) (0.04) (0.02) (0.66)
Gini coefficients -0.002 0.015∗∗ -0.006 0.188∗
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.06)
Ethnic fractionalization - prob. -0.009 0.529 -0.293∗∗ -10.198∗∗
(0.04) (0.36) (0.05) (3.06)
Constant -0.503∗∗ -0.487 -4.586∗∗∗ -71.309∗∗∗
(0.14) (1.48) (0.31) (7.37)
Observations 206 230 147 189
R2 0.694 0.435 0.702 0.565
Adjusted R2 0.685 0.419 0.689 0.551
Standard errors in parentheses
Huber and White robust standard errors
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
45
From the table 6, we see that trust almost always have a significant, positive effect
on institutions (except on property rights). However, before we proceed and interpret
the results, we need to keep in mind the important contributions pioneered by North,
Acemoglu, Aghion and many others on the complexities of determinants of the types of
institutions, and the myriad factors responsible for their existence or creation. Hence,
the evidence presented here is to be read as an indication.
For one percentage point increase in trust levels, the institutional quality measures are
expected to increase by 0.327, 1.083 and 1.176 percentage points, holding all other
variables constant, and in the cross-country sense.46 This suggests that the positive
45 1. Without wave fixed effects tables presented in appendix.
2. Excluded countries from the regressions for reasons mentioned earlier are: Latvia (1990), Lithuania
(1990), Estonia (1990), Russia (1990), Romania (1993), Belarus (1990), Bulgaria (1991), Hungary (1991)
and Bosnia and Herzegovina (1998).
46 To recall, the institutional variables are standard normalized on the following scale:
1. ICRG - 0 to 1
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effects on Rule of Law and ICRG index have the greatest magnitude, and less so on
Economic Freedom index. The positive effects on Property Rights have large coefficients,
but they are not significant.
As briefly mentioned earlier, let us remind ourselves that the institutions variables mea-
sures are ajar to criticisms. So, how can we interpret these results to provide some
useful insight, even if it is just an indication? - Trust is always positively related to
institutions. There is also the average income or levels of development having positive
effects on institutional quality. The reverse causality question is not clear - do institu-
tions cause income increases for example? This reaffirms the general hypotheses that
“good” institutions working to ensure contracts are enforced, set the rules of the game
and facilitate economic activities turn out to have higher incomes.
When we turn to the gini coefficients’ point estimates, we see that they are negatively
correlated (and not significant) to institutions in models (1) and (3). When they are
positive in models (2) and (4), they are also significant interestingly. However, when we
observe closely we notice that the institutions quality variables of models (2) and (4) are
rather specific - pertaining to very specific economic spheres of institutions - property
rights and economic freedom. They are expected to facilitate economic activity and
hence improve incomes. This in turn will have an impact on the income distribution.
From the results we observe that in countries where property rights are stronger and
economic freedoms are higher, they are also positively correlated with higher income
inequalities. At the same time, of course, the question of causality lurks on the direction
of the relationship between inequality and economic freedom or between inequality and
property rights.
Population and ethnicity can perhaps be merged together while interpreting our table
6, partly because they are significant simultaneously in model (3) and negative. This
could mean that creating institutions in a less fractionalized society with relatively less
population is easier. This manifests in other models too by the sign of their correlations,
but they are not always significant.
4.3 Determinants of Trust - Logistic regression micro-estimates
Logistic model has been used to fit our data with the binary outcome dependent variable
of “interpersonal trust” at the micro level, thanks to the integrated values dataset merg-
ing all the WVS and EVS waves. We have 421,799 observations in the total sample. This
dataset will also enable us to include the country fixed effects.47 A cross-country inves-
2. Economic Freedom - 1 to 10
3. Rule of Law - -2.5 to 2.5
4. Property rights - 10 to 100.
47 Country-survey fixed effects and survey fixed effects alone are also tested.
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Table 7: Determinants of Trust - ordered-logit micro estimates 1980-2009
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Trust Trust Trust Trust Trust
Trust
Age 1.005∗∗∗ 1.004∗ 1.008∗∗∗ 1.006∗∗ 1.005∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Age squared 1.000∗∗ 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Married 1.031∗∗∗ 1.019∗ 1.017 0.982 1.023
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Sex 1.007 1.004 1.012 1.019 1.019
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Employment 1.194∗∗∗ 1.129∗∗∗ 1.176∗∗∗ 1.138∗∗∗ 1.173∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Education 1.106∗∗∗ 1.091∗∗∗ 1.078∗∗∗ 1.083∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
No. of children 1.015∗∗∗ 1.015∗∗∗ 1.016∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Unemployed 0.949∗ 0.967 0.941∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Student 1.283∗∗∗ 1.278∗∗∗ 1.266∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
Self-employed 1.057∗∗ 1.075∗∗∗ 1.047∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Habitat size 0.990∗∗∗ 0.988∗∗∗ 0.990∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Religious or not 0.935∗∗∗ 0.943∗∗∗ 0.931∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
(Sub.) Income 1.041∗∗∗
(0.00)
Atheist 1.069∗
(0.04)
Protestant 1.073∗∗
(0.03)
Muslim 1.206∗∗∗
(0.05)
Buddhist 1.086
(0.09)
Catholic 1.051∗∗
(0.03)
Hindu 1.146∗∗
(0.08)
Jew 1.156
(0.14)
Sunni 1.298∗∗
(0.17)
Shia 0.865
(0.19)
Constant 0.177∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.163∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 378669 293346 155559 137903 144745
R2
Adjusted R2
Pseudo R2
AIC 441710.2 326336.5 171666.3 151920.9 158841.6
BIC 442881.4 327490.8 172641.8 152874.8 159899.0
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
Country fixed effects included
Huber and White robust standard errors
Country population weights applied
Regression 4 with subjective income scales variable
Coefficients represent the odds of Trust=1 when X increases by 1 unit
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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tigation of determinants of trust is of course inviting, but the pseudo R squared of our
micro-estimates suggest that apart from the variables we can control for, there are several
country specific heterogeneity for the determinants of trust that require moving away
from a cross-country analysis. A regional focused, micro or better, a multilevel model is
useful to control for several hierarchically affecting factors. The cross-country analysis
approach is also extensively documented in the subjective well-being literature.48
Figure 2: Twoway Trust-GDP/capita and Growth-GDP/capita (full sample)
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Note: Luxembourg and Bosnia & Herzegovina observations dropped from this figure.
Summary tables found in appendix.
Age and age squared variables are significant and takes an “inverted U” form against
trust - a downward concave relationship. This is akin to what is also found in the
subjective well-being literature of the relationship between age and happiness variables,
or the life satisfaction variables using the values surveys. This means that the odds of
being trustful increases with age up until a certain point (or age), then it declines.49
Remember, our dataset is a snapshot of the world,50 so this result does not imply that
this is a generational trend - that a person is more trusting as he grows up and then his
48 Cf. Easterlin et al. (2010), Clark et al. (2008), Graham (2014) among others.
49 Graphs on quadratic relationship, and the marginal effects of age and trust are found in the appendix.
50 Although, a snapshot of over 28 years of data.
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trusting behavior declines after a certain age. Perhaps this is the case, but this is not
clear. To verify this, a panel data is required.
Being a male also favors to being more trusting, as found in other empirical papers, but
they are not significant in any of our models. Being married increases the odds of being
more trusting, and significantly so in models (1) and (2).51
Employment (along with Student dummy) is the one of the most significant variables
in terms of high odds of increasing trusting behavior, across all the models with 1%
statistical significance. This is also true with increasing education levels of people.52 We
can infer that the capability of being employed or educated (or currently in education
- student dummy) increases the odds of being trustful of others. If we were to stretch
this interpretation further, we can also say that the social stigma of not being employed
and not being educated has its negative effects. This is further strengthened with the
unemployed dummy odds on trusting behavior.
Having children improve the trusting attitudes of people, or parents at least. These
are positive and significant in all the models.53 Habitat size (the population size of
the village/town/city in which one lives in) has a negative and significant effect on
trust. This may imply that more the people in a society, the social interactions and
personal transactions are “anonymized” and thus leading to decline in the likelihood of
interpersonal trust between “unknown” people.
When we turn to the coefficients of being religious or not dummy, we see that they
are negatively and significantly related to trust; much like being an atheist (or not
dummy). Every “major” religious denomination that a person declares to adhere to, has
a positive and significant effect on trusting others, except for being a Buddhist, Jew or
a Shia. Being a Buddhist or being a Jew is positively correlated to trust, but they are
not significant. Being a Shia is negatively correlated to trust, but that is not significant
either.
We have executed the Haussman test which points at using the fixed effects model instead
of a random effects model. This confirms what we discussed earlier on the pseudo R
squared and the micro versus macro trade-offs.54
51 Incidentally, when we extend the definition of marriage to include all unions (but not officially
married), they are no longer significant.
52 The probability of being trustful increases with higher levels of education accomplished. Refer to
the graph in the appendix on the marginal effects of education levels on trust.
53 However, we don’t observe the similar relationship as observed between the marginal effects of
education and trust, with respect to number of children and trust. The relationship is a lot weaker, if
any.
54 1. Brant and BIC tests.
2. With and without fixed effects results presented in appendix.
3. Employment dummies also tested with various arbitrary cutoffs of education levels.
4. Literacy dummies also tested.
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All our models of the three principal equations have gone through several validity and
robustness tests. To summarize what we have done for robustness and internal validity,
we answer the following questions: First, how our estimated parameters vary as different
models are used. Second, in these papers found in this literature, researchers tend to
examine only a few representative specifications, but there is no reason why they couldn’t
examine many more if the data were available. We did precisely that. We would also
add that the effect may change when we alter the covariates or the sample, but it does
so in a predictable and theoretically consistent manner - yet another definition to be
called robust.
4.4 Associational activity and civic norms - 2000 combined WVS and EVS sample
Inequality is the prominent variable which is significant almost always at 5% and a
negative determinant of trust and civic norms in our sample. Olsonian groups (and not
so much Putnamian groups) in general have a significant effect on trust and civic norms.
For one percentage point increase in Olsonian groups’ membership, the trust measures
are expected to increase by 0.34, 0.45 and 0.51 percentage points on average, depending
on the model, holding all other variables constant. Levels of development is one variable
having a significant positive effect on trust and not civic norms. The same is observed
with education have a positive and significant effect on trust, and not on civic norms
(they are surprisingly negative and significant).
Of course, this section is to provide us with an indication alone on the associational
activity and its links with trust and civic norms in a country.
5. Children dummies instead of the number of children ware also used.
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Table 8: Determinants of Trust: Group memberships [2000 sample]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Trust Trust Trust Trust Trust
ln(GDP/capita) 0.034∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Education 1.859∗∗ 1.503 1.754∗ 1.436 1.337
(0.92) (0.98) (0.92) (1.03) (1.13)
Gini coefficients -0.005∗∗∗ -0.002 -0.006∗∗∗ -0.001 -0.001
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Groups 0.057∗∗ -0.030
(0.02) (0.10)
Olsonian 0.342∗∗∗ 0.448∗∗∗ 0.506∗∗
(0.10) (0.15) (0.24)
Putnamian 0.141∗∗ -0.084 -0.029
(0.07) (0.10) (0.18)
Constant -0.004 -0.134 0.073 -0.186 -0.183
(0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.15) (0.15)
Observations 53 53 53 53 53
R2 0.438 0.502 0.401 0.512 0.514
Adjusted R2 0.391 0.461 0.351 0.460 0.450
Standard errors in parentheses
Huber and White robust standard errors
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 9: Determinants of Trust: Group memberships [2000 sample]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Civic Civic Civic Civic Civic
ln(GDP/capita) 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Education -0.571∗∗ -0.606∗∗ -0.588∗∗ -0.600∗∗ -0.644∗∗
(0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.27) (0.26)
Gini coefficients -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗ -0.001∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Groups 0.006∗ -0.011
(0.00) (0.02)
Olsonian 0.034∗∗ 0.028 0.050
(0.01) (0.03) (0.04)
Putnamian 0.018∗ 0.005 0.026
(0.01) (0.02) (0.05)
Constant 0.393∗∗∗ 0.382∗∗∗ 0.401∗∗∗ 0.385∗∗∗ 0.386∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Observations 41 41 41 41 41
R2 0.273 0.288 0.271 0.289 0.297
Adjusted R2 0.192 0.209 0.190 0.188 0.173
Standard errors in parentheses
Huber and White robust standard errors
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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5 Conclusion
In this exercise to revisit the questions of social capital and its economic payoffs, we
observe that (interpersonal) trust continues to be an important variable in a larger sense
if we consider social cohesion as an important dimension of human development, and
also to have economic payoffs in societies.
Generalized trust can be trusted over time and across countries, to have positive effects
on economic development and institutions. This is true when we take all countries
together (a cross-national global phenomenon). More importantly, we go a step further
in establishing causality between trust and economic development. Trust also tends to
have a longer lasting effect on economic development (10 years > 7 years > 5 years).
There are of course some confounding elements that this analysis unveils, and this in
our opinion only nourishes the research on social capital.
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Table 10: Relational Capability Index: Dimensions and components
Dimensions Components Deprived if
Integration
to network
Employment status No stable job with regular professional re-
lations
Access to transport No means of transport
Access to telecommunications Does not use a phone, a computer or the
internet
Access to information Does not obtain news from radio, televi-
sion or newspaper
Private
relations
No. of people in the HH Lives alone
Family ties No trust in family
Close friends No close friends providing psychological &
emotional support
Financial support No financial support from relatives or ac-
quaintances
Trust in the community No trust in people the individual knows
Civic
commitment
Membership No active membership in a group
Collective action No participation in political action
Vote Does not vote
Solidarity No active membership in common interest
group
Trust in others No trust in unknown people
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Figure 3: Generalized trust levels across time in the combined WVS and EVS surveys
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Table 11: Trust on Growth - cross-country fixed effects regressions 1980-2009
(1) (2) (3)
Growth5 Growth7 Growth10
trust 4.431∗∗∗ 3.726∗∗ 5.004∗∗∗
(0.85) (0.99) (0.88)
lngdpc20 -1.619∗∗ -2.165∗∗ -2.455∗∗∗
(0.55) (0.49) (0.38)
piref -4.124∗∗ -2.803∗ -2.784∗∗
(1.06) (1.03) (0.79)
bl asy25mfref -0.027 0.088 0.013
(0.14) (0.12) (0.12)
o.High income 0.000 5.686∗∗ 5.082∗∗
(.) (1.40) (1.26)
Low income -4.442∗∗
(1.20)
Lower middle income -1.497∗∗ 3.745∗∗ 3.027∗∗
(0.42) (1.16) (0.97)
Upper middle income -0.521 5.128∗∗ 4.536∗∗
(0.40) (1.51) (1.01)
o.Low income 0.000 0.000
(.) (.)
Constant 20.148∗∗ 18.511∗∗∗ 21.915∗∗∗
(4.41) (2.95) (1.99)
Observations 233 197 197
R2 0.420 0.423 0.565
Adjusted R2 0.402 0.402 0.548
Standard errors in parentheses
Huber and White robust standard errors
Country income level group dummies included
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure 4: Marginal effects of Age on Trust (quadratic and continuous)
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Figure 5: Marginal effects of Age on Trust
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Figure 6: Marginal effects of Education Levels on Trust
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Figure 7: Marginal effects of Number of Children on Trust
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Figure 8: Trust and age - quadratic relationship
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Figure 9: Trust and per capita income levels by survey waves
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Figure 10: Trust and per capita income levels by survey waves
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Table 12: World Values Survey - 2000 sample
No. Country year trust congov lifesat happy civic growth
1 Sweden 1999 0.66 . 7.65 3.29 . 3.09
2 Iran 2000 0.65 2.86 6.38 2.81 36.86 1.18
3 China 2001 0.55 3.36 6.53 2.87 37.58 10.22
4 S. Arabia 2003 0.53 . 7.28 3.35 . -0.55
5 Indonesia 2001 0.52 2.57 6.96 3.15 35.77 0.50
6 Iraq 2004 0.48 2.20 5.23 2.66 . 14.87
7 Japan 2000 0.43 2.10 6.48 3.17 37.35 0.58
8 Vietnam 2001 0.41 3.74 6.52 3.41 38.08 6.63
9 India 2001 0.41 2.58 5.14 2.95 35.74 4.66
10 Canada 2000 0.39 2.33 7.80 3.39 36.22 2.93
11 Egypt 2000 0.38 2.66 5.36 3.06 37.78 3.32
12 United States 1999 0.36 2.31 7.65 3.32 35.33 2.78
13 Spain 2000 0.34 2.39 6.99 3.06 35.89 3.99
14 Pakistan 2001 0.31 2.26 4.85 2.94 38.89 0.82
15 Jordan 2001 0.28 3.34 5.64 2.92 38.32 0.81
16 South Korea 2001 0.27 2.19 6.21 2.96 . 4.28
17 Nigeria 2000 0.26 2.48 6.87 3.58 35.80 1.81
18 Albania 2002 0.24 2.62 5.17 2.59 35.53 4.48
19 Morocco 2001 0.24 2.63 6.05 3.05 37.94 1.66
20 Bangladesh 2002 0.24 3.28 5.78 2.90 39.40 1.87
21 Israel 2001 0.23 . 7.03 3.02 . 1.66
22 Chile 2000 0.23 2.58 7.12 3.16 33.13 4.65
23 Puerto Rico 2001 0.23 2.48 8.49 3.47 36.91 3.81
24 Mexico 2000 0.21 2.18 8.13 3.48 31.96 1.39
25 Serbia 2001 0.20 2.09 5.62 2.83 36.32 2.97
26 Turkey 2001 0.19 2.28 5.81 3.03 . 1.72
27 Singapore 2002 0.17 . 7.13 3.23 35.40 3.04
28 Kyrgyzstan 2003 0.17 2.13 6.48 3.04 33.78 0.86
29 Venezuela 2000 0.16 2.58 7.52 3.42 34.75 0.20
30 Bosnia & Herz. 2001 0.16 2.17 5.77 3.02 37.36 38.74
31 Argentina 1999 0.15 1.85 7.33 3.13 35.91 0.08
32 Moldova 2002 0.15 2.18 4.57 2.53 28.88 -0.11
33 Macedonia 2001 0.14 1.59 5.12 2.89 35.51 0.66
34 Zimbabwe 2001 0.12 2.56 3.94 2.66 38.09 -2.12
35 South Africa 2001 0.12 2.54 5.81 3.12 33.26 2.10
36 Algeria 2002 0.11 2.48 5.67 2.96 35.16 1.84
37 Peru 2001 0.11 2.06 6.44 2.95 34.02 1.54
38 Philippines 2001 0.08 2.54 6.67 3.26 30.65 0.72
39 Tanzania 2001 0.08 3.34 3.87 3.50 37.91 1.42
40 Uganda 2001 0.08 3.15 5.62 3.03 33.71 2.69
Note: congov - Confidence in Government; lifesat - Life Satisfaction; happy - Happiness; trust1
- Trust in Neighborhood; and trust2 - Trust in Family.
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Table 13: European Values Survey - 2000 sample
No. Country year trust lifesat happy civic rci growth
1 Denmark 1999 0.67 8.24 3.39 37.73 . 2.73
2 Sweden 1999 0.66 7.65 3.29 . . 2.11
3 Netherlands 1999 0.60 7.88 3.41 35.33 . 3.11
4 Finland 2000 0.58 7.87 3.13 35.44 . 4.11
5 Belarus 2000 0.42 4.81 2.69 28.64 . .
6 Iceland 1999 0.41 8.05 3.44 . . 0.70
7 N. Ireland 1999 0.39 8.07 3.42 . . .
8 Spain 1999 0.39 7.09 3.06 . . 2.85
9 Ireland 1999 0.36 8.17 3.38 . . 9.63
10 Germany 1999 0.35 7.61 3.03 35.82 . 1.10
11 Austria 1999 0.34 8.02 3.25 35.74 . 2.30
12 Italy 1999 0.33 7.17 2.95 36.12 . 1.39
13 Belgium 1999 0.31 7.56 3.33 33.59 . 2.11
14 United Kingdom 1999 0.30 7.40 . 35.14 . 3.93
15 Ukraine 1999 0.27 4.56 2.44 31.65 . .
16 Bulgaria 1999 0.27 5.34 2.41 . . -1.26
17 Luxembourg 1999 0.26 7.87 3.29 33.37 . 3.67
18 Lithuania 1999 0.25 5.09 2.79 32.38 . .
19 Czech Republic 1999 0.24 7.06 2.96 34.79 . 2.50
20 Greece 1999 0.24 6.67 2.91 31.45 . 1.98
21 Russia 1999 0.24 4.74 2.46 33.18 . -3.28
22 Estonia 1999 0.23 5.90 2.70 . . 4.88
23 France 1999 0.22 6.93 3.22 32.86 . 1.50
24 Hungary 1999 0.22 5.69 2.81 . . 2.27
25 Slovenia 1999 0.22 7.23 2.91 . . 5.99
26 Malta 1999 0.21 8.21 3.16 . . 4.35
27 Poland 1999 0.19 6.37 2.93 . . 6.13
28 Croatia 1999 0.18 6.46 2.90 35.36 . 3.36
29 Latvia 1999 0.17 5.27 2.61 . . .
30 Slovakia 1999 0.16 6.03 2.74 . . 5.91
31 Romania 1999 0.10 5.23 2.39 . . 1.66
32 Portugal 1999 0.10 6.98 3.00 . . 3.02
33 Turkey 2001 0.07 5.09 2.61 . . 1.94
Note: Relational Capability Indicator (RCI) could not be constructed due to several
missing questions for our 2000 sample.
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Table 14: World Values Survey - 2008 sample
No. Country year trust trust1 trust2 congov lifesat happy civic rci growth
1 Norway 2008 0.74 0.91 0.99 2.53 7.96 3.33 35.86 0.77 2.01
2 Sweden 2006 0.68 0.90 1.00 2.35 7.74 3.39 35.28 0.78 3.24
3 Finland 2005 0.59 0.86 0.99 2.67 7.84 3.21 35.94 0.70 3.14
4 Switzerland 2007 0.54 0.87 0.99 2.70 8.01 3.36 37.18 0.73 1.40
5 China 2007 0.52 0.86 0.99 3.32 6.76 2.94 35.38 . 12.23
6 Vietnam 2006 0.52 0.90 1.00 3.78 7.09 3.15 36.41 0.58 7.56
7 New Zealand 2004 0.51 0.91 0.99 2.34 7.89 3.36 36.62 . 2.50
8 Australia 2005 0.46 0.82 0.99 2.31 7.28 3.27 36.41 0.73 2.30
9 Netherlands 2006 0.45 0.70 0.93 2.08 7.76 3.36 36.68 0.69 1.42
10 Canada 2006 0.43 0.84 0.98 2.30 7.76 3.41 36.38 0.73 2.32
11 Indonesia 2006 0.43 0.78 0.99 2.61 6.91 3.18 37.36 0.68 3.55
12 Thailand 2007 0.42 0.76 0.98 2.36 7.21 3.32 30.97 0.56 4.40
13 Hong Kong 2005 0.41 . . 2.58 6.41 2.90 35.45 . 4.71
14 Iraq 2006 0.41 . . 2.69 4.46 2.42 . . -1.00
15 United States 2006 0.39 0.80 0.98 2.31 7.32 3.27 35.34 0.71 1.77
16 Japan 2005 0.39 . . 2.14 6.99 3.18 37.37 . 1.49
17 Germany 2006 0.37 0.76 0.98 2.01 7.13 3.02 35.73 0.66 1.32
18 Jordan 2007 0.31 0.86 1.00 3.43 7.12 3.14 36.37 . 3.64
19 United Kingdom 2006 0.31 0.80 0.98 2.18 7.60 3.43 35.53 0.71 2.81
20 Italy 2005 0.29 0.69 0.99 2.07 6.89 3.07 36.81 0.63 1.30
21 Uruguay 2006 0.28 0.76 0.96 2.65 7.46 3.15 35.10 . 0.40
22 South Korea 2005 0.28 0.72 0.99 2.38 6.35 2.99 35.29 0.61 5.21
23 Ukraine 2006 0.28 0.73 0.98 2.04 5.67 2.83 31.34 0.61 11.88
24 Russia 2006 0.26 0.68 0.99 2.32 6.09 2.76 32.62 0.59 10.24
25 Ethiopia 2007 0.24 0.79 0.97 2.09 4.99 2.88 36.95 0.66 3.54
26 Taiwan 2006 0.24 0.81 0.99 2.15 6.58 3.04 35.71 0.62 3.99
27 India 2006 0.23 0.87 0.98 2.63 5.79 3.02 31.86 0.67 5.72
28 Bulgaria 2006 0.22 0.74 0.99 2.14 5.22 2.60 35.22 0.57 7.58
29 Romania 2005 0.20 0.50 0.97 2.00 5.75 2.56 36.14 0.51 8.28
30 Andorra 2005 0.20 0.51 0.98 2.21 7.13 3.20 34.55 0.65 .
31 Spain 2007 0.20 0.76 0.99 2.37 7.32 3.05 35.19 . 2.26
32 Poland 2005 0.19 0.75 0.98 1.94 7.02 3.12 35.34 0.59 4.27
33 France 2006 0.19 0.82 0.95 2.01 6.91 3.25 33.04 0.67 1.55
34 South Africa 2007 0.19 0.73 0.98 2.94 7.03 3.15 33.87 0.61 3.55
35 Egypt 2008 0.19 0.95 1.00 . 5.74 2.91 37.21 0.56 2.55
36 Georgia 2008 0.18 0.92 1.00 2.14 4.96 2.75 37.38 0.59 9.29
37 Slovenia 2005 0.18 0.60 0.98 2.07 7.24 2.97 33.56 0.61 4.57
38 Moldova 2006 0.18 0.54 0.98 2.11 5.45 2.48 31.70 0.55 8.14
39 Argentina 2006 0.18 0.71 0.98 2.22 7.79 3.20 34.94 0.62 1.99
40 Mali 2007 0.17 0.86 0.98 2.96 6.09 3.20 31.15 0.62 2.16
41 Guatemala 2005 0.16 . . 2.20 7.95 3.23 31.89 . 1.30
42 Mexico 2005 0.16 0.54 0.91 2.35 8.23 3.49 30.55 0.58 1.79
43 Serbia 2006 0.15 0.66 0.99 2.01 6.01 2.69 25.50 0.61 6.51
44 Burkina Faso 2007 0.15 0.71 0.95 2.44 5.57 3.01 33.83 0.54 2.08
45 Colombia 2005 0.14 0.56 0.96 2.46 8.31 3.35 . 0.56 2.92
46 Morocco 2007 0.13 0.84 0.99 2.62 5.25 3.03 36.68 0.60 4.45
47 Chile 2005 0.13 0.57 0.97 2.39 7.16 3.08 32.47 0.54 3.90
48 Zambia 2007 0.12 0.58 0.94 2.41 6.06 2.78 30.31 0.60 2.71
49 Iran 2007 0.11 . . 2.60 6.43 2.94 33.98 . 4.17
50 Cyprus 2006 0.10 0.51 0.98 2.52 7.37 3.21 34.62 0.62 1.94
51 Brazil 2006 0.09 0.56 0.94 2.34 7.65 3.24 31.90 0.60 1.73
52 Malaysia 2006 0.09 0.81 0.99 3.02 6.84 3.31 29.50 0.60 3.47
53 Ghana 2007 0.09 0.63 0.94 2.95 6.12 3.25 35.59 0.59 2.95
54 Peru 2008 0.06 0.38 0.93 1.79 7.04 2.94 . 0.50 3.68
55 Rwanda 2007 0.05 0.90 0.97 . 4.97 2.95 34.82 . 5.64
56 Turkey 2007 0.05 0.75 0.99 2.77 7.46 3.19 37.94 0.52 4.08
57 Trinidad & To. 2007 0.04 0.61 0.95 2.12 7.33 3.37 34.29 0.61 11.17
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Table 15: European Values Survey - 2008 sample
No. Country year trust congov lifesat happy civic rci growth
1 Denmark 2008 0.76 2.54 8.36 3.44 37.60 0.80 1.15
2 Norway 2008 0.74 2.43 8.10 3.36 36.07 0.73 1.79
3 Sweden 2009 0.70 2.47 7.63 3.19 34.16 0.73 2.78
4 Finland 2009 0.65 2.28 7.72 3.00 36.50 0.63 2.95
5 Netherlands 2008 0.63 2.41 8.01 3.52 36.10 0.71 1.47
6 Switzerland 2008 0.55 2.64 8.01 3.34 36.29 0.69 1.61
7 Iceland 2009 0.50 2.17 8.01 3.48 36.62 0.76 1.87
8 Azerbaijan 2008 0.45 2.65 5.94 2.82 34.32 0.59 27.31
9 Belarus 2008 0.45 2.67 6.07 2.91 29.91 0.54 10.99
10 Germany 2008 0.40 2.07 7.10 2.96 35.07 0.60 1.47
11 United Kingdom 2009 0.40 1.87 7.49 3.33 36.59 0.59 1.87
12 Ireland 2008 0.38 2.23 7.79 3.41 34.36 0.67 1.88
13 Austria 2008 0.36 1.92 7.55 3.16 34.30 0.61 2.32
14 Belgium 2009 0.36 2.13 7.67 3.38 34.41 0.62 1.98
15 Spain 2008 0.35 2.19 7.32 3.17 34.44 0.56 1.30
16 Luxembourg 2008 0.33 2.71 7.90 3.31 34.59 0.64 2.99
17 Estonia 2008 0.32 2.20 6.69 2.89 34.84 0.54 8.06
18 Italy 2009 0.31 2.01 7.14 3.00 36.24 0.68 0.37
19 Czech Republic 2008 0.31 1.91 7.21 2.97 33.20 0.54 5.50
20 Lithuania 2008 0.30 2.05 6.45 2.73 32.15 0.47 9.61
21 Russia 2008 0.29 2.64 6.52 2.81 31.53 0.54 9.56
22 N. Ireland 2008 0.29 2.02 7.84 3.35 34.88 0.63 .
23 Ukraine 2008 0.28 1.81 6.08 2.79 34.62 0.54 11.60
24 Poland 2008 0.28 1.92 7.21 3.05 33.65 0.52 5.37
25 France 2008 0.27 2.10 7.08 3.26 33.26 0.63 1.02
26 Bosnia & Herz. 2008 0.27 1.92 7.09 3.06 35.74 0.46 4.93
27 Latvia 2008 0.26 1.90 6.36 2.84 32.84 0.52 10.11
28 Montenegro 2008 0.25 2.23 7.43 3.05 36.30 0.49 7.34
29 Slovenia 2008 0.24 2.30 7.55 3.04 35.39 0.57 5.41
30 Georgia 2008 0.23 2.46 5.48 2.81 36.44 0.56 10.05
31 Malta 2008 0.23 2.48 7.91 3.24 38.30 0.55 2.10
32 Greece 2008 0.22 1.87 6.92 3.01 32.93 0.55 3.63
33 Hungary 2008 0.21 1.77 6.29 2.92 36.29 0.52 3.79
34 Armenia 2008 0.21 2.41 5.70 2.94 35.32 0.53 14.06
35 Croatia 2008 0.20 1.81 7.04 2.98 34.45 0.50 5.03
36 Portugal 2008 0.20 1.99 6.82 3.06 35.59 0.56 0.26
37 Macedonia 2008 0.19 2.43 6.85 3.03 37.04 0.57 4.39
38 Bulgaria 2008 0.18 1.66 5.83 2.69 36.97 0.52 7.90
39 Romania 2008 0.18 1.96 6.78 2.84 33.73 0.48 9.05
40 Slovak Republic 2008 0.13 2.44 7.27 2.94 32.42 0.57 7.50
41 Serbia 2008 0.12 1.80 6.84 2.85 36.67 0.48 6.62
42 Moldova 2008 0.12 2.17 6.59 2.71 34.45 0.47 7.85
43 Turkey 2009 0.11 2.48 6.50 2.93 38.72 0.52 5.07
44 Kosovo 2008 0.11 2.82 6.90 3.09 38.35 0.50 .
45 Albania 2008 0.10 1.97 6.30 2.76 33.84 0.47 12.48
46 Cyprus 2008 0.09 2.69 7.36 3.15 33.28 0.57 1.87
47 N. Cyprus 2008 0.05 2.30 6.28 2.99 39.00 0.54 .
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